Migration Policy in South Africa (2023)

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Contents
South Africa as a Destination Country: Five Classic Characteristics
recommendations

Entry

Migration is an important feature of South African history. The country is built on migration, be it internal migrants moving from rural to urban and industrialized areas, or migrants from neighboring countries going to South Africa as servants in search of work and a better life for themselves and their families.

South Africa has long been a major destination country for the region, but migration patterns have changed since the 1990s. With the easing of apartheid policies in the 1990s leading to the collapse of the apartheid system in 1994, South Africa has evolved towards a more inclusive one. a diverse and open society and more regular migration from other African countries emerged.

However, despite this long history, migration and the place of migrants in South Africa remain controversial both in policy and in practice. This is reflected in the way migrants are spoken and treated. Migration myths abound: in the current discourse on migration in South Africa, immigrants are often portrayed as being responsible for the country's crimes, draining resources, and claiming to take advantage of opportunities that should be reserved for South Africans. Nuances are often missing. In the worst case, xenophobic attitudes manifest themselves in violence directed against foreigners, mainly from other African countries.

South Africa's migration policies and practices reflect developments in other destination regions in Africa, Europe and around the world. Faced with high immigration rates, especially coupled with a fragile domestic labor market, destination governments tend to resort to restrictive immigration and protection systems. Migration is becoming a controversial and publicized issue and can fuel misconceptions and anti-immigrant sentiment. South Africa, which is home to a fifth of all migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa, is no exception. While South Africa benefits from foreign labor, it imposes stricter labor migration and border management laws. The wave of domestic crime in South Africa after 1994, partly related to the growing number of migrant workers and refugees, prompted the authorities to drastically reduce access to asylum and permanent residence and to increase the number of returning migrants. These moves show a largely introspective approach to migration management, favoring securitization over inclusiveness and regional integration, but have done little to reduce long-standing problems such as corruption and the growing backlog of the country's asylum system.

This document sets South Africa as an example for other migratory destinations, both within and beyond the African continent. In addition, the paper raises three questions: To what extent does the case of South Africa show similarities with Europe as a migration destination? To what extent does South Africa illustrate the challenges of other destination countries in Africa? And what can European and German politicians learn from the experience in South Africa?

The first part describes how five common features of the main destination regions for migrants have shaped South Africa's migration policy in recent years: the increase in immigration, the debate on illegal migration, the rise of xenophobia, the dominance of deterrence policies and the difficulties of reconciliation. regional migration policies for free movement. The second part provides specific recommendations on what European politicians can learn from the experience in South Africa and what they can do to support a migration policy that works better in Africa's main destination region. South Africa may not be Europe's closest neighbour, but the challenges they share as migratory magnets should encourage Europeans to learn from their experiences, identify areas of common interest and use these relationships more strategically.

While the main focus of this article is South Africa's policies and practices adopted and implemented by the state, the perspectives of South African society as a whole are also reflected. Perception does not always translate into reality, but the case of South Africa shows how perception can frustrate political efforts towards a cohesive and inclusive society. There are other important issues that are part of the migration discussions in South Africa, such as issues such as asylum seekers, international protection, brain drain, internal migration, human trafficking and smuggling. outside the scope of this case.

South Africa as a Destination Country: Five Classic Characteristics

Growing Migration to South Africa:Make a migration magnet

The demand for workers has made South Africa a major destination country in Africa. Historically, regional mobility to South Africa has been driven mainly by increased demand for labor in the mining industry. For example, between 1940 and 1980, approximately 1.5 million immigrants from neighboring countries were employed as miners and agricultural workers, and an additional 1.7 million workers were employed in Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho and Eswatini in the 1980s 1990-2000 (formerly Swaziland) through the African Employment Office.

More than nine out of ten migrants in South Africa live in South Africa alone: ​​more than 4.2 million out of a total of 4.5 million migrants

Today, migration is an important part of the regional dynamics of southern Africa, where mobility is still predominantly circular. South Africa hosts the majority of all migrants in the region. More than nine out of ten South African migrants live in South Africa alone: ​​over 4.2 million out of a total of 4.5 million migrants (see Figure 1). About one-fifth of the 23 million migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa live in South Africa. This makes South Africa the 10th highest net immigration and emigration in the world.

Although the decline in mining employment has led many migrant workers to unregulated labour-intensive sectors of the economy such as domestic work, construction and agriculture, important migration corridors still connect semi-skilled migrants to South African mines and farms, e.g. Africa. Africa and Zimbabwe-South Africa. Today's larger diasporas in South Africa are the result of these long-term regional migration flows. Seven out of ten foreign-born South Africans come from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho, with a smaller proportion of immigrants coming from other parts of southern Africa as well as West and East Africa and Western Europe, especially the United Kingdom (UK). ) (see figure 2). South Africa's post-apartheid political stability has also provided shelter to refugees fleeing conflicts in neighboring countries such as Mozambique and Angola or further afield such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Women make up a significant proportion of migrants: in 2019, women accounted for more than 44% of international migrants in South Africa. Regionally, women are estimated to account for 70% of informal cross-border traders and account for 40% of all trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Data from the 2011 Census and the 2012 and 2017 Quarterly Labor Force Surveys (QLFS) show that around one in four South African migrant women work as domestic workers, often with little or no employment protection at all.

Irregular migration:Scope unclear, controversial debate

Illegal migration is hotly debated in South Africa, but its extent remains unclear. Reliable figures are scarce, with official estimates ranging from 500,000 to more than 2.2 million people living illegally in South Africa (estimates much higher than 11 million are unlikely). Given the country's population of about 60 million, it is estimated that undocumented immigrants make up between less than 1 percent and about 4 percent of the total population.

The fragmentation of the foreign recruitment system has contributed to spontaneous and informal cross-border movements. In the absence of legal routes, many low-skilled migrants from the rest of Africa enter the country illegally or undocumented, or violate visa conditions after legal entry, accepting work on a tourist visa or overstaying, including both sub-regional and non-sub-regional immigrants, especially Horn of Africa.

As elsewhere, irregular migrants are at greater risk of discrimination and exploitation by corrupt government officials, but the problem is particularly pronounced in South Africa. Corruption is rampant among Home Office officials, according to reports. There is evidence that migrants experience corruption at many stages of the documentation process, with existing laws and standards driving the illegal document market. Despite clear efforts to tackle the problem over the years, Home Office officials themselves estimate that up to 85 percent of employees are guilty of corruption. The Home Office also says illegal migration leads to corruption.

For much of South Africa's history, undocumented migration from the region was state-sanctioned and sometimes included in labor supply schemes.

The current situation of irregular migrants is rooted in the history of denial of residence and citizenship to migrants from Africa. For much of South Africa's history, undocumented migration from the region was state-sanctioned and sometimes included in labor supply schemes. Until the 1960s, people from Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini were free to travel to and from South Africa and live and work in South Africa. But during apartheid, immigration was determined by the "two doors" policy. White migration was deemed desirable, and so they were allowed to enter through the "front door" because their presence posed no threat to the "European culture" that the apartheid state attempted to foster. . Meanwhile, African immigrants often entered the country "through the back door", tolerated only because they met the need for labor in mining and agriculture. This "back door" was characterized by police, detentions and deportations. The situation was exacerbated by policies restricting access to black South Africans outside of "homelands".

Xenophobic language and attacks are widespread

Xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment are rampant in South Africa. For example, in the 2001 national survey of South African citizens by the South African Migration Program (SAMP), nearly half of the respondents believed that immigrants were a "crime threat" and 37 percent thought they were a threat to jobs and economy. and 29 percent considered them a health risk.

Economic concerns have a particular impact on the marginalized and poor black majority under pressure from poverty, inequality and lack of opportunity: the unemployment rate is a precarious 29.1 percent as of 2020, with higher youth rates. Immigrants and refugees in South Africa are often accused of "stealing" jobs from the local population, especially since unemployment among foreigners is well below the national rate.

The results of the investigation contradict this story. The 2014 Migration for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC), the 2018 OECD-ILO study and the 2018 Stats South Africa labor market performance report show that while unemployment among migrants is lower than among South Africans, this does not automatically mean that they are "stealing" jobs from South Africans, as they often take jobs that local people do not want to take in services, agriculture, construction and, to a lesser extent, the industrial sector. As in other destination countries around the world, migrants often find employment in insecure and unregulated environments due to lower entry costs, but also because of the many barriers to entry into the formal labor market, including difficulties in obtaining and renewing legal documentation, accessing services and opening bank accounts.

Xenophobic sentiments also characterize the language and terms South Africans use to talk about immigrants. Non-citizens are referred to as "foreigners" or "foreigners", but pejorative colloquialism"Net"it is also common. Public discourse often evokes images of mass migration with metaphors of "waves", "floods" and "swamps" that supposedly engulf the land. The climate of hostility is further perpetuated by the media and political discourse. For example, politicians have argued that undocumented immigrants are responsible for the state's inability to effectively serve society, the increase in crime and violence in communities, and other social problems. The adoption in 2019 of the action plan against xenophobia has done little to effectively combat xenophobic speech.

Violent physical attacks against foreigners are common in South Africa, especially against African and South Asian foreigners. In May 2008, a series of outbursts of violence against foreigners marked the culmination of a persistent climate of xenophobia in the country. More than 60 people were killed, more than 600 injured, and tens of thousands were displaced and took refuge in churches and police stations, especially around Cape Town and Johannesburg. The police services reacted too late and few cases were finally opened.

In fact, many consider violence to be justified: The 2017 Human Sciences Research Council Survey of Social Attitudes found that 71 percent of the South African population cited the threat of migrants as the main explanation for violence against migrants; one third of the respondents answered that xenophobia is a reaction to the criminal activities of foreigners; and almost 40 percent. responded that it was a response to the economic activity of foreigners.

South Africa's migration policy:Enforcement and deterrence first

While South Africa's migration policy is balanced on paper, in practice it tends towards deterrence and law enforcement. South Africa's current vision for migration policy is outlined in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). The document comprehensively covers all areas related to inbound and outbound migration. It promotes a balanced approach that recognizes the opportunities for regional and international migration on the one hand and the shortcomings of the current system on the other.

Overall, the White Paper proposes six main approaches. First, it presents a risk-based and guaranteed approach to migration to protect South Africa's sovereignty and the security of its citizens. Second, it seeks to eliminate a system that perpetuates illegal migration, which in turn "leads to unacceptable levels of corruption, human rights violations and threats to national security." Thirdly, it points to the problem of national attitudes towards migration. Fourth, it addresses the gaps between South African law and SADC objectives. Fifth, he wants to end a system that perpetuates "colonial patterns of production and labor trade," reserving the right to migrate to people with high skills and capital. Sixth, it aims to expand the immigration of highly skilled workers while reaffirming national labor preferences.

The White Paper should serve as a model for reviewing and updating existing legislation: the Refugee Act 1998 and the Immigration Act 2002 have already been amended accordingly, the Citizenship Act 1995 is under review, one of which is the on authorities and border management. . new laws that the country has adopted since the White Paper (see Figure 4).

However, the provisions revised or developed on the basis of the White Paper do not show a balanced approach of the document, but a stricter approach. The effects of this approach are visible in three main areas: immigration, asylum and border management.

Immigration: more arrests of illegal migrants

The Immigration Act Amendment Act 2018 (which includes proposed amendments to the Immigration Act 2002 that have not yet been enacted) adds provisions for detaining "illegal aliens" for deportation. While these measures are presented as solutions to an overburdened immigration system, there are three concerns about this "detente and deport" policy. Firstly, the Ministry of the Interior has a poor record of running detention centres. In 2014, the South African Human Rights Commission detailed human rights violations at the Lindel Repatriation Center, including procedural violations, inhuman and dangerous conditions, violence, and the illegal detention of large numbers of people. Secondly, the detention approach runs counter to the African Union's Common Position on the Global Pact on Migration. In particular, the position calls on all countries to discourage and dismantle immigrant detention, regardless of the legal status of migrants, given the risk of human rights violations. Third, the evidence shows that detention does not really stop migration. On the contrary, it encourages migrants to take more risks. This can undermine other outcomes of migration management, such as limited caseloads, shifting of resources and clogged justice systems.

Refugee and asylum trials: discouraging entryfor protection

Access to the South African refugee and asylum system is difficult for a number of reasons. First, waiting times are long and the quality of decisions varies. The country's refugee processing system is plagued by a long backlog, although the number has been significantly reduced from one million in 2016 to over 150,000 today. Most asylum seekers wait several years for their application to be processed, which means that the number of asylum seekers is increasing (Figure 5). At the same time, the country has a particularly high asylum rejection rate of 90 percent. While the government uses this figure to justify its restrictive measures, refugee advocates and others question the poor quality of refugee status recognition processes and outcomes. In 2016-2017, more than 1,200 immigration and 1,900 asylum cases were brought against the DHA. Recent statements by the judges who overturned the refusals included strong allegations about the state of the asylum system. These included labeling them "incompetent" and "regrettable" and accusing DHA officials of "gross disregard of the law, dereliction of duty and ill will".

The DHA seems to follow the logic that reducing the incentive for immigrants to apply for asylum would reduce the number of applications and enable a more transparent and flexible system. However, this logic is based on the erroneous assumption that the asylum system is affected by the large number of asylum seekers, not by a flawed application process itself.

Second, DHA also makes it harder for asylum seekers to apply and renew their documents at so-called Refugee Admissions Offices. Starting from 2011, it closed or limited access to offices in urban centres, forcing applicants to go to offices in border areas and putting more pressure on other offices. The 2017 White Paper went further and proposed the establishment of asylum processing centers to host asylum seekers during the determination process. The DHA does its best not to label them as detention centers, but the proposed methods mirror detention centers in all but name. The human rights costs are high and well documented, as are the financial costs. The construction of one processing center will cost around 298 million rand (€17,600,000), not including operating costs.

Finally, the legislation also aims to reduce the attractiveness of seeking asylum in South Africa. For example, the 2017 amendment to the Refugee Act abolished the automatic right of asylum seekers to work, study or run a business. Other important changes have expanded the grounds on which refugee status can be revoked (e.g. by applying to your embassy's consular services) and have given DHA the power to close or designate a refugee reception office.

Border management: building a Stop and Take policy.

The task of managing South Africa's borders rests with at least seven different government departments operating at the ports of entry (air, land and sea). This has proven to be a nuisance given the volume of migration to and from South Africa. Accordingly, the Border Management Authorities Act 2020 establishes a single authority to oversee all aspects of the border environment: the Border Management Authority (BMA) will report to the DHA, making it the lead authority for all border related matters. The BMA came into force in July 2020 and will be implemented in phases over 15 years.

Overall, the establishment of the BMA is a positive step towards effective and coherent management of borders and border ports. However, other government agencies (such as the police, defense and prosecution) and think tanks (such as the ISS) have expressed serious concerns about the DHA's ability to lead the initiative and to securitize borders and threaten corruption and fraud more broadly. The main problem is that the establishment of the BMA fuels South Africa's longstanding "arrest and deport" policy, despite high human and financial costs and questionable effectiveness.

Hesitation towards regional free movement

Unlike other migrant magnets on the African continent and beyond, South Africa's stance on regional integration and free movement is marked by protectionist concerns. About 75 percent of all African migrants in southern Africa come from this region. As a major recipient of regional migration, South Africa is concerned about a possible surge in immigration from neighboring countries. This sometimes hinders constructive dialogue with other SADC countries: South Africa favors smaller bilateral and multilateral agreements on labor mobility. To this end, it established three Joint Standing Commissions (JPCs) with Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini and concluded four Memoranda of Understanding on labor migration with Botswana, Lesotho, Eswatini and Namibia. It should be noted that other larger economies within the regional bloc, such as Botswana and Namibia, also have some concerns about free movement in the region.

South Africa's immigration policy is not sufficiently in line with its commitment to increasing freedom of movement on the continent.

The publication of the 2017 White Paper seemed to indicate a certain readiness of South Africa to deepen regional integration. The document acknowledged that South Africa's immigration policy was not sufficiently in line with its commitment to increasing freedom of movement on the continent. The document aims to remedy this and solve the problem of illegal migration from neighboring countries by proposing the introduction of new visa options for low- and medium-skilled immigrants from the SADC region. These include the SADC Special Work Visa, the SADC Merchant Visa, and the SADC Small and Medium Business Visa for Self Employed and Small Business Owners.

But the White Paper also contains various other proposals that hinder rather than encourage regional mobility. For example, it suggests adopting a points-based immigration policy for skilled workers, based on the experiences of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, to replace the current employer-centric approach combined with a list or quota of critical skills. In fact, such a strategy would complicate the migration of low-skilled workers, who account for a large proportion of total mobility in the region.

Regional policy is also ambiguous. Eighty percent of SADC nationals benefit from visa waivers or short stay visas upon arrival (up to 90 days) to other SADC Member States thanks to the 2005 SADC Protocol to Facilitate Movement of Persons (see Figure 6). The SADC Additional Protocols facilitate the mobility of certain categories of persons, such as diplomats and students. In fact, however, the 2005 protocol encourages Member States to conclude bilateral agreements, especially on border issues, which then take precedence over the non-binding protocol. As a result, regional migration is reduced in the long term: in order to stay in another SADC country for more than 90 days, migrants must comply with national regulations and undergo lengthy and costly bureaucratic vetting. Those who are unable to provide the necessary documents can extend their visa or choose non-scheduled routes as an alternative.

The trend is clear across the region: governments seem reluctant to invest in regional integration in terms of migration. Few countries in the region have made significant progress towards regional harmonization of immigration procedures, despite the work of the IOM-SADC Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA). Again, the safety lens could dampen the political appetite for SADC free movement. Member States often resort to "emergency measures" to manage migration, especially when there are serious security concerns such as violent extremism and terrorism in parts of northern Mozambique. However, the pervasive 'securitisation' approach seems to have undermined the ability of regional authorities to reduce transaction costs and achieve win-win outcomes – all pillars of functioning and mutually beneficial free movement systems.

recommendations

South Africa's migration policy may sound strange to European ears, but this report shows that many elements of South Africa's migration policy and debate should sound familiar, be it securitization, an increasingly toxic approach to migration, security systems, flawed safeguards or controversial attempts to harmonization of migration. . schemes in all regions.

The following recommendations outline lessons learned from the South African experience and highlight common areas of concern that German and European politicians, policy experts and practitioners should consider in their discussions with their South African counterparts.

1. Recognize a pear when you see it.

South Africa is one of the main destinations for migrants and refugees in Africa. Political decision-makers in Germany and Europe are, of course, aware that migratory flows in Africa go far beyond migration from the north to European shores. However, their approach to African countries often remains tainted by stereotypes of African countries as major countries of origin or transit, apart from many destination countries, some long-term (such as South Africa) and some emerging countries (such as Morocco, Tunisia or Ghana). The fact that most movements in Africa are regional and circular, with a few imams across the continent receiving most African migrants, is acknowledged rhetorically but not always politically.

Recognition of the equality of African countries in migration issues can significantly contribute to improving communication between continents. This is more important now than ever as Europeans enter a critical moment in their relations with their African partners, with the EU's Comprehensive Strategy for Africa and the implementation of the post-Cotonou agreement with the Organization for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. (OACP).

2. Learn from our mistakes: evaluate the costssecuritized approaches to migration

As this report shows, South Africa has heavily restricted access to immigration and asylum and has invested in border management and deportation. However, given the lack of available data, it is unclear whether the policy actually reduced the flow of immigrants. The South African authorities admit that such a policy is costly, and human rights groups say it is incompatible with the rights of refugees. However, the authorities did little to address the shortcomings in the system, in particular delays and corruption, which were in fact compounded by the closed and/or limited reception offices for refugees.

South Africa's experience should lead policy makers in Europe to consider the costs that securitized approaches to migration management may entail, especially if they fail to simultaneously improve their crisis-ridden asylum systems. This is crucial globally as the number of migrants and refugees is at a record high and is likely to continue to increase in the coming years due to the pandemic and subsequent economic crises.

3. Words matter: avoid offensive languageWhen we talk about migration

The South African experience shows how social perceptions of migration and official discourses and policies are interconnected. Pejorative terms such as "foreign" and the colloquial "makwerekwere" in the South African context have entered the public perception and continue to fuel xenophobic sentiment. The terms influence the perception of migration, the policies that regulate migration and ultimately the experiences of the migrants themselves.

Policymakers in Europe should also refrain from using pejorative terms and images that present an alarming picture of migration. These include references to floods, waves or mass migrations to talk about newcomers from the African continent. More neutral terms are "mobile people", "people on the move" or "arrived".

4. Support regional and continental integrationin Africa

Just as European integration has developed over decades and is still sometimes controversial, regional integration in Africa is not a matter of course. Under SADC, South Africa tends to favor small-scale migration deals and bilateral migration deals, which limits SADC's efforts to regulate migration at the regional level. However, while restrictive and burdensome for migrants, these arrangements have ensured a degree of free movement and movement of labor that would not otherwise have been ensured.

European lawmakers have wisely invested in strengthening the capacity of regional economic communities to promote free movement across the continent, especially in regions closer to home, such as West Africa. However, they should not underestimate the importance of other regional migration centers on the continent. If leading economies such as South Africa are more reluctant to move away from protectionist policies, even slow progress on their part in terms of regional mobility would be a strong signal and could spur positive change elsewhere in Africa, perhaps more so than funded projects . Europe.

Therefore, European politicians must continue to support regional integration efforts, but must adapt their approach. The European integration project can do little to assuage South African politicians' concerns about economic and security issues. Europeans cannot ignore these concerns, which are widespread across the continent, but must actively address them. In particular, they should help to harmonize entry requirements, exchange best practices on border management and return, and set up circular labor migration schemes that can help prevent irregular migration, for example through the South African Migration Dialogue (MIDSA), SADC and SADC. EU dialogue. Europeans could also consider providing additional support for data collection capacity to raise policymakers' awareness of migration and promote evidence-based policy. Investing in South Africa's regional free movement is essential to deliver on the promise of an unlimited continent, in line with Europe's Continental African Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Free Movement Protocol. This ambitious goal also fits perfectly with the EU's interest in circular migration in Africa and simply cannot be achieved without regional migration actors such as South Africa.

Therefore, EU policymakers must look beyond the obvious migrant partners it targets in North and West Africa. They should initiate structured migration talks with countries that may be more geographically distant, but whose power as migration magnets extends as far as they can shape mobility on the African continent and beyond. South Africa may not be Europe's closest African neighbor, but it can and should become the continent's main migration partner.